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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The political object-the original motive for the war-will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War
The question this paper will examine: is can a military commander practice effective operational art with ambiguous strategic objectives? Since the United States Army adopted the concept of operational art in its doctrine, the Army has focused on linking tactical actions on a battlefield with achieving strategic objectives. According to the latest version of American Army doctrine, operational art is "the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, or purpose."
2 While this definition may seem overly simplistic, there is in fact a deeper meaning of operational art. The definition implies a clear understanding of strategic objectives. Additionally, this definition of operational art seems to imply that those strategic objectives are both tangible and attainable through military force.
Current American doctrine and historical literature both support the idea that military commanders must focus their operations towards clearly defined objectives. One popular school of thought, the Weinberger doctrine, is built upon the notion that military force should only be used with clearly defined military and political objectives that are achievable with an appropriate level of force. 3 However, history has shown that governments have used military force towards ambiguous or unattainable strategic objectives. A great example of this phenomenon is the American intervention in the Russian Civil War, which is the case study of this monograph.
The hypothesis of this monograph is that the commander can still practice effective operational art with ambiguous strategic objectives. Reading current doctrine, the operational commander would expect that the national level leadership provides clearly defined and attainable strategic objectives. However, history proves this is not always the case. Operational commanders should expect that the strategic guidance from the national level authority may be unclear and subject to change throughout the course of the operation. 4 While the lack of clear strategic objectives may challenge the operational artist, the absence of clear objects provides the operational commander greater flexibility in arranging his operations in time, space and purpose.
Purpose and Methodology
The overall purpose of this monograph is to provide a perspective of operational art with ambiguous strategic guidance. To answer the research question and test the validity of the hypothesis this paper provides background research, doctrinal analysis, and a case study that demonstrate effective operational art with ambiguous strategic objectives. The paper's basic structure is a five-chapter monograph with Chapter One being a short introduction and Chapter Five the conclusion. Chapter Two presents a discussion of effective operational art with ambiguous strategic objectives. Chapter Three is in-depth case study of the American intervention in the Russian Civil War, specifically the American Expeditionary Force-Siberia.
Chapter Four is the analysis of the case study in terms of the chosen theoretical construct. The overall goal of this paper is to provide insight to the practitioner about applying operational art with ambiguous strategic objectives and provide one concrete example of operational art under such conditions.
The Case Study
The subject of the case study is the often overshadowed by other events in World War I.
However, it provides a rich and colorful example of operational art under strategic ambiguity. In Over the course of three decades, the United States Army has continued to refine its definition of 13 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 14 Department of the Army, ADRP 1-02, 1-41.
operational art to the current version. The result is that theory and doctrine agree that operational art links tactical actions with the greater strategic objectives of a nation.
Defining Strategic Objectives
If operational art directs tactical actions towards achieving strategic objectives, it then begs the question: who defines those strategic objectives? According to Shimon Naveh, it is the "supreme political authority formulates the political-strategic aims and defines the strategic objective." 17 Theoretically, the president, as the premier civilian and military leader of the country, is responsible for defining the strategic objectives. Doctrinally, the answer is not as clear. In order for the operational commander to practice effective operational art with ambiguous strategic objectives, he should follow a methodology of distilling the strategic objectives, defining the military objective, envisioning an end state, and developing an operational approach. As previously mentioned, the first step is reducing the ambiguity by fostering a dialogue and collaboration with the national leadership. In working to reduce the ambiguity, the commander can distill the strategic guidance into more definitive strategic objectives. He can then derive tangible military objectives that support the strategic objectives.
The commander should use not only his own personal knowledge and experience in developing these objectives but rely on his staff to increase creativity and critical thinking.
26 By developing tangible military objectives, the commander then can direct his military operation toward a clearly defined and achievable goal.
As the commander is considering his objectives, he should also envision an end state that supports those objectives. According to ADRP 3-0, "the end state is a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when the operation ends." 27 The end state assists the commander as an operational artist because it provides clarity for the mission and helps focus the operation on achieving strategic and military objectives. Typically, the end state includes military conditions but may also contain nonmilitary conditions if the situation warrants it. Closely associated with the end state are termination criteria, which are the specified conditions the commander must meet before an operation can conclude and normally represents the time beyond which the President does not require the military, as the primary means, to achieve remaining 31 By using a military design process, the commander not only develops his operational approach, but also forms the basis of his conceptual planning. By using a design methodology, the commander reduces more of the ambiguity by facilitating a great understanding of the operational environment and problem. The commander should then integrate the operational approach into the detailed planning process, which produces an operation plan that incorporates the strategic objectives, military objectives and desired end state.
The commander begins to develop his operational approach in the early stages of planning, and must continue to refine it throughout the planning process and the execution phase of the operation. By beginning to develop his operational approach early, the commander has time to reframe the objectives, end state, and the operational approach. Reframing enables the 28 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, I-8. 29 Department of the Army, ADRP 3-0, 4-2. 30 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 5-0, III-7. 31 The commander can select either the operational design process found in JP 5-0 or the Army design methodology found in ADP 5-0. commander to revisit his previous "hypotheses, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current operational approach."
32 Reframing should occur when operational conditions change, including the strategic context of the operation, requiring the commander to revisit his earlier analysis. In military operations with ambiguous strategic objectives, the strategic context is likely to change. In cases like this, the need to reframe periodically is imperative. Good examples of this are the Korean War and the Vietnam War where the strategic guidance from the president changed, necessitating the commander to reframe the objectives, end state, and operational approach. Reframing and refining the objectives, end state, and operational approach greatly improve a commander's practice of effective operational art.
Conclusion
Like most artistic media, a one-sentence definition does not adequately define the operational medium. Art is subjective, often defined by both form and content, and usually judged on the result of the artist's efforts or the final product. In this sense, operational art is not that different. Therefore, the operational commander must assess the effectiveness of his application of operational art based on his success in achieving the strategic objectives. Effective operational art often times involves taking ambiguous strategic guidance from the national leadership and translating it into a desired end state. Doctrine and theory can mislead the operational artist into believing that national level leadership will provide clearly defined and attainable goals. The operational artist must be prepared to work with ambiguous strategic guidance and build his operational plan based on his formulation and definition of the strategic objectives and end state. The next chapter examines a historical case that shows this to be true. Overall, the Americans were unprepared and lacked a clear understanding of their mission, the conditions in Siberia, or even the strategic context of the intervention. The result was that the expedition, in the opinion of one scholar, "was a classic demonstration of an isolated and uninformed military subject to irrational government decisions."
52
The Operational Environment
In the summer of 1918, the operational environment in far eastern Russia was chaotic at best. Siberia, which is a territory the size of North America, had twenty-four separate 50 Willett, under "3475," Amazon Kindle edition.
51 Edward M. Coffman, "The Intervention in Russia, 1918 -1921 ," Military Review, 68, No 9 (1988 Under the ruthless leadership of Gregory Semenoff and Ivan Kalmikov, the Cossack bands' 57 Ibid., under "3720" Amazon Kindle edition.
undeclared mission was to terrorize the local populace using rape, theft, and murder. 59 Under the guidance of the Japanese, the Cossacks' efforts intimidated the population but also prodded the Americans into action. The Japanese viewed the Americans as a barrier to gaining territory in Siberia and attempted to force the Americans into supporting their objectives or withdrawing from Siberia.
The AEF-S Operations
Upon his arrival in Siberia, Graves lacked the situational understanding of both the operational environment and the strategic complexity of their mission. He spent considerable time during his journey to Vladivostok studying the aide memoire and concluded that the primary military objective was assisting the Czech legion in moving to the Western Front. However, soon after arriving, he determined that the Allies had never intended sending the Czechs to the Western Front." 60 Therefore, one of the publicly stated strategic objectives was a farce. It provided the Allied governments' political cover to gain public support for a military intervention in Russia.
Yet it was never a realistic objective because the other Allied nations, including the Czechs, had no intention of proceeding to the Western Front in France. In fact, with the backing of the French and even some American diplomats, the Czech legion began a campaign against the Bolshevik forces in Russia. The French led the Czechs to believe that "Allied forces would be coming to relieve Czechs in the near future." 61 As a result, the AEF-S placed very little emphasis on helping the Czechs leave Russia since it was a useless prospect from the start. Throughout the spring, the Americans encountered increased resistance in that sector. Graves ordered reinforcements to help quell the violence with no effect. In a series of increasingly lethal 70 Ibid., 193. Wilson's decision potentially signaled a change in strategic direction, which was even more problematic for Graves than his personal dislike of Kolchak. Graves attempted to clarify the apparent discrepancy between the president's decision and his original guidance by cabling the 73 Maddox, 101-103. 84 Graves, 343. 85 Ibid., 10.
Czechoslovakian Legion and protecting the military stores from capture by the Germans. In arriving at his strategic objective, he is not solely at fault. By failing to define clearly his strategic objective, Wilson created ambiguity and disharmony, which plagued the entire campaign. This illustrates that Graves's overall analysis and conclusion of strategic objectives was correct based on Wilson's lack of strategic guidance.
Military Objectives
As stated in Chapter 2, the effective operational artist should translate strategic objectives into tangible military objectives. The first step in that process is reducing the possible inherent ambiguity associated with strategic objectives. The operational commander should seek a dialogue with the president to reduce the ambiguity and achieve a common understanding. 86 To
Graves's credit, he sought to reduce the ambiguity embedded in the strategic objectives in the aide memoire. However, Wilson never afforded the AEF-S commander the opportunity to discuss his strategic guidance directly, but instead sent Baker to deliver his guidance. Based on his meeting with Baker and his lengthy study of the aide memoire, Graves appropriately determined his overall strategic objective. Graves' performance that he authored the introduction to Graves' memoire in which wrote:
"Graves had the misfortune of being one of the first to command an armed force ordered to achieve limited diplomatic goals rather than military victory." CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION This monograph demonstrates that a military commander can practice effective operational art with ambiguous strategic objectives. Doctrine, theory, and history all show that military operations must be directed towards clearly defined goals. Furthermore, current doctrine portrays the idea that the president will provide the operational commander with these clearly defined and attainable goals. However, history demonstrates this is not always the case. In reality, the operational commander should expect strategic guidance from the national level authority that may be unclear and subject to change throughout the course of the operation. This situation presents a unique challenge for the operational artist to overcome. He must first reduce the ambiguity of his strategic objectives in order to practice effective operational art. One technique borrowed from the design world is to foster a collaborative dialogue with the national level leadership. Reducing the ambiguity, clarifies the commander's strategic objectives so he can begin practicing effective operational art.
In this situation, effective operational art does not end with simply identifying the strategic objectives. The commander must continue the process of translating those objectives into tactical actions. He relies not only on his own personal experience and insights but must also leverage the collective knowledge of his staff. The process continues as he derives tangible military objectives and envisions a desired end state that supports the strategic objectives. This allows him to create an operational approach, which modifies the current conditions to achieve the desired end state. Furthermore, it enables the detailed planning of tactical actions. Although these steps facilitate effective operational art by reducing ambiguity inherent in strategic objectives, the commander must remain vigilant in indentifying and assessing changes in strategic and operational conditions that necessitate reframing. Reframing allows the commander to revisit his initial analysis and adjust his objectives, end state, and operational approach to address changes in conditions. By following this process, the commander, with the help of his staff, can practice effective operational art with ambiguous strategic objectives. This monographs case study provides a remarkable example of exercising operational art with ambiguous strategic objectives as exemplified by Graves' performance in Siberia. Wilson produced ambiguous strategic objectives by never clearly articulating his ultimate rational and intent for the use of military force in Russia. Graves correctly recognized the challenging situation and attempted to reduce the ambiguity by fostering a dialogue with his superiors in the War Department. He rightly concluded that his overall strategic objective was to support the greater war effort while not interfering in Russian internal matters. Subsequently, he derived his military objectives, envisioned a desired end state, and developed an operational approach that supported his overall strategic objective. These are all hallmarks of effective operational artists.
Ultimately, people judge a commander on his ability to achieve the strategic objective.
As the case study demonstrated, this form of judgment can be problematic when the strategic objectives are ambiguous. Throughout the campaign, Graves adhered to his strategic guidance and avoided undertaking any tactical actions that the Russians might construe as interfering in their internal affairs. Even though his decision brought him into direct confrontation with the State Department and the Allies, Graves refused to alter his objectives and operational approach until directed by the president. The unwavering support of the War Department and Wilson for Graves's performance in Siberia illustrates that he attained the strategic objective and excelled as an operational artist under difficult conditions. If Graves faltered as an operational artist, it may have been due to his reluctance to reframe his original analysis and conclusions after the strategic context changed in June 1919. However, to his credit, Graves sought to rectify the potential change in American policy towards Russia but never received a definitive answer. In the end, Graves achieved his original strategic objective of supporting the Allies without entangling the
